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The Connexion Between Old and New Approaches 






In this paper we compare the new satisfaction evaluation approach, developed in the nineties 
by Oswald, Clark, Blanchflower and others with the older income evaluation (IEQ) approach, 
developed by Van Praag and Kapteyn in the seventies of the previous century. We find that 
both approaches yield strikingly similar results with respect to financial satisfaction. The IEQ-
approach yields additional insights, but it is not well applicable to other life domains than 
finance. It is argued that the usual Probit specification implies a specific cardinalization and, 
consequently, is less ordinal than usually thought. It is shown that the Probit-approach may be 
replaced by three other equivalent specifications that have some computational and intuitive 
advantages.  
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This paper is partly based on Chapter 2 of Happiness Quantified : A Satisfaction Calculus 
Approach (2004) by B.M.S. Van Praag and A. Ferrer-i-Carbonell.  







The subject 'happiness' of this timely book is one of the most pressing ones for the 
behavioural sciences in general and for economics in particular. As I am an economist 
by upbringing, I will restrict myself mostly to the economic viewpoint, although it is 
clearly unavoidable that there will be points of tangency with the other behavioural 
sciences, especially with psychology. 
Economists agree on the fact that individuals strife for the greatest happiness. Let us 
assume two situations x1 and x2 and let us assume that the two situations generate  
happiness values W1 and W2 , where W2 > W1 , then the individual will choose x2 , if 
that situation is in his choice set. It follows that the function W(x) describes a very 
basic aspect  of human behaviour. Choice between scarce things is the core subject of 
economics. 
 
It is therefore normal that economists developed this choice model, where human 
choice behaviour is described as maximizing a function W on a relevant choice set. 
One of the first economists who proposed it was Edgeworth in his book Mathematical 
Psychics (1881). He thought of W as a cardinal concept. If W(x1)=1 and W(x2)=2, then 
the individual derives twice as much utility
1 (or happiness) from x2 as from x1. 
 
Pareto(1904) was the first to raise doubts about the practical possibility to observe and 
estimate the function W. Moreover, he showed that in the case of static consumer 
behaviour we do not need to know the function itself but only its contour lines, the so 
– called indifference curves, which are described by the equations:  
 
                               4   
  () Wx C =  (1) 
where C  stands for a constant. The same net of indifference curves is described by  
 
                                                    (( ) ) () Wx C ϕ ϕ =  (2) 
 
where ϕ (.) stands for an arbitrary monotonously increasing function. 
The net of indifference curves defines an equivalence class of functions  ( ( )) Wx ϕ , 
that have the same contour lines.  
In the meantime there arose a growing aversion among economists towards 
'psychologizing'. The term 'happiness' was abandoned for 'ophelimity ' and later on for 
'well –being ', 'welfare  ' or for the still less emotionally loaded term 'utility' or 
'satisfaction'. 
The  practical difficulty to estimate the function W  was annoying for economists and 
it led to the gradual coming –up of the axiom that utility was immeasurable. Notice 
that an axiom is not proven but proposed and accepted. The high priest of this dogma 
was Lionel Robbins (1932) and it was supported by Hicks (1939), Samuelson (1947) 
and Houthakker (1950). We may say that after 1950 an economist was not taken 
seriously, if he was not professed his belief in this dogma. 
As a consequence, in consumer theory the use of a cardinal utility function was either 
completely abandoned or it was used as just a handy instrument in order to describe 
the indifference curves. The latter function was  was called the ordinal utility 
function. To one net of indifference curves corresponds a whole equivalence class of 
ordinal utility functions , satisfying equation (2). 
 
However, there were some problems left. The first point arose with decisions under 
uncertainty. If we accept the von Neumann- Morgenstern model, where we have a 
lottery L with outcomes x1 and x2 and corresponding probabilities p and (1-p ) , the 
individual is assumed to decide on expected utility 
 
  ( ) ( ) 1 () ( 1 ) EW pW p W =+ − x 2 x




1 We shall not differentiate between the terms utility, well-being, and happiness 5   
Now it is clear that if we replace W by a non – linear monotonously increasing 
transform ( ) W ϕ  and we have two lotteries L1 and L2, then it may be that L1 is 
preferred to L2  when we use W and that L2 is preferred to  L1 when we use  ( ) W ϕ .  It 
is obvious that in the setting of uncertainty we have to require that W is a cardinal 
utility concept. That is,  ( ) W ϕ  is defined up to a positive affine transformation, i.e., 
()  w i t h   WW 0 . ϕ αβ =+ β >  Actually, by observing lottery behaviour for various 
values of p we can estimate the values W up to a positive linear transform. We notice 
however that in the limiting situation where   we are back in the situation of 
choice under certainty. Hence, if we assume that the certainty – situation is a special 
case of the more general uncertainty –situation we see that we cannot simultaneously 
maintain the validity of the unmeasurability axiom and VNM – theory. 
1 p →
 
Ragnar Frisch stated in 1959: 
 
‘To me the idea that cardinal utility should be avoided in economics is completely 
sterile. It is derived from a very special and indeed narrow part of theory, viz., that of 
static equilibrium’. 
 
In Van Praag (1968) I added to this quote (p.158): This author agrees completely with 
Frisch's value judgment. The above – mentioned controversy seems to me the reason 
why there is found nowhere a really synthesizing analysis which brings under one 
denominator the theories of consumer behavior in a certain world and in an uncertain 
world. A similar story may be told with respect to decisions over time ( e.g. saving, 
investment). 
 
It is indeed true that static consumer behaviour may be described by an ordinal utility 
concept. It follows that we cannot estimate and identify a cardinal utility function by 
observing static consumer behaviour, when prices vary. But this fact does not entail 
that cardinal utility would be unmeasurable per se or a ridiculous concept. The 
statement only indicates that we should look for another measurement method. 
 
There is still a rather basic observation to be made. When we have two alternative 
situations x1 , x2 and x3 , in most cases individuals will not only be able to say that 6   
they prefer x2 to x1 and x3 to x2  , that is Wx 12 () () () Wx Wx 3 < < , but they are also able 
to say whether the improvement going from x1  to  x2  is more or less than the 
improvement associated with going from x2 to x3 . Individuals are able to compare 
utility differences. But this is just what is necessary and sufficient for having a 
cardinal utility function (see Suppes and Winet (1954)). 
One of the other methods by which we may investigate how individuals evaluate 
specific positions is by not observing their choice behavior, but much more simply by 
asking them how they evaluate those alternatives, either on a verbal scale ranging 
from 'very  bad ' to 'very good' or on a discrete (or ideally continuous) numerical finite 
scale , for instance from 0 to 10 or from 0 to 1.  
In this framework we shall assume that satisfaction will always be measured on a 
finite interval scale, preferably [0,10]. That is, however the position will be   
described, either by a vector x or by a verbal description or by an image, vignet, etc., 
denoted by x as well, satisfaction will be described by a numerical function S(x), 
where worst positions are evaluated by 0 and best positions by 1.  
 
This is the method, developed in the nineties, which   employs so – called 'satisfaction 
questions'.  Subjects are e.g. job satisfaction (Clark and Oswald, 1994), Health 
Satisfaction (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Van Praag, 2002), Financial Satisfaction, or 
Satisfaction with 'life as a whole ' (Van Praag et al., 2003). 
 
In this paper we shall focus on Financial Satisfaction (FS). Let us assume that 
Financial Satisfaction is a function U( y ; x) of household income y and other personal 
characteristics x. Our question is then whether we can derive this function from the FS 
– question. 
It turns out that there are four ways to derive a meaningful function U(.) from the FS – 
question. Their connexion, similarity and differences we will explain in Section 2.  
 
As some readers will be aware of, in the seventies Van Praag (1971) and Van Praag 
and Kapteyn (1973) were considering the same problem. They formulated a different 
question module, the Income Evaluation Question (IEQ) and attempted to estimate a 
cardinal utility function of income U( y; x), which was called the Individual Welfare 
Function of Income (WFI). 7   
In Section 3 we critically consider this second but earlier WFI -approach in more 
detail and we will see that the IEQ yields two utility function estimates, where one 
may be identified as a decision utility function and the other as an experienced utility 
function in the sense of Kahneman, Wakker and Sarin (1997). The functions, derived 
from the FS – approach may be identified as variants of the experienced utility 
function. It turns out that the experienced utility functions derived from either of the 
two roads are identical up to a positive linear transformation. 
In Section 4 we present some empirical evidence. 
In Section 5 we conclude that the IEQ stores more information than the FSQ at the 
expense of the fact that it requires more information from the respondent and is thus 
harder to answer. A second point is that it seems hard (but perhaps not impossible) to 
apply the IEQ  -approach with respect to other domains than Financial Satisfaction. 
Moreover, we make some observations on the state of the art and the embedding of 
the happiness results in behavioural sciences in general and in economics in 
particular. 
 
2. Four methods of analysis for the satisfaction question 
 




How satisfied are you with your household income…………………………………….. 




This question is posed in the German  Socio–Economic Panel (GSOEP). A similar 
question is posed in the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). The only difference 
between both modules is that the British survey questionnaire distinguishes between 
seven categories, while the German question has eleven response categories. The 
question is put in many other surveys as well. We notice that the response categories 
are explicitly described in terms of numerical grades,e.g., from 0 to 10. In other 
modules the response categories are verbal, ranging from 'very bad' to 'very good'. 
The verbal version is somewhat older and preferred by some as being better 8   
understandable by respondents, although it is also thought that words may not carry 
the same feeling for each respondent, diminishing the validity and the interpersonal 
comparability of the question. 
The numerical version gives less room for ambiguity. As most individuals are well- 
acquainted with numerical evaluations since their school days, it may be surmised that 
the evaluations may be interpreted as cardinal evaluations. It is obvious that, although 
the satisfaction question requires a categorical answer, the underlying phenomenon is 
continuous. 
Let us assume that individuals t in the population are ordered on the interval [0,1] 
according to their satisfaction, such that in the interval [0,t] is a fraction t of the 
population. It is obvious that we may define the satisfaction S(t) of individual t as 
S(t)=t . In that case satisfaction is a purely relative phenomenon.  For instance, if 
t=0.6 it implies that 60% of the population is less satisfied than t and hence t 's 
satisfaction is 0.6. However, it is obvious, as we do not know the function S, that any 
other increasing function on [0,1] may be just as credible. It is the objective of this 
paper to get more clarity on that. The response categories correspond with the 
intervals of a partition of the unit interval. We assume a model of the type 
 
S(tg ) [ ln( ) ln( ) ] y f s α βγ =+ + ε +                      (4) 
 
where g(.) is an increasing function, where y  stands for household income, fs stands 
for family size and ε  is a random disturbance term with  ( ) 0 E ε = , which is 
uncorrelated with the structural part. In the sample y and fs are random variables as 
well. For convenience we define the variables ln(y) and ln(fs) as deviations from their 
means. This may evidently be rewritten as  
 




1(( ) ) Z gS t
− = . As this paper does not concentrate on empirical results we take 
here only two explanatory variables. 
 
A .Ordinal Probit 
 9   
Let us assume a random sample of size N ,cosnsisting of respondents n. The usual and 
first method to estimate this relation is by Ordered Probit, where it is assumed that the 
error term ε is N(0,1)- distributed. The relation (5) implies that  . The 
response categories for Z correspond with intervals ( µ
( , ) Z ∈− ∞∞
i-1, µi ]. In terms of the original  
t the response classes are ( ti-1, ti ]. For an individual who evaluates his financial 
satisfaction by   it implies that  n i 1 n in Z




[ ( ln( ) ln( ) ) ( ln( ) ln( ) )]
nn
N
in n i n n
n
N y fs N y fs µ αβ γ µ αβ −
=
−− − − −− − ∏ γ (6) 
 
, where N(.) stands for the standard – normal distribution function, is maximized with 
respect to µ,α,β. Generally, we are most interested in the parameters α,β , which 
determine the trade –off ratio between y and fs. The parameters µ  are called the 
nuisance  parameters; they are mostly overlooked. Here, we are especially interested 
in those µ ,  because they give insight in the cardinalization, which is implicitly 
applied by using the Probit model. It is easy to assess the µ 's by equalizing moments. 
More precisely, we have for the conditional probability that individual n's satisfaction 
will be found in the i 
th satisfaction interval  
 
1 1 ( , ) ( ln( ) ln( ) ) ( ln( ) ln( ) ) in i n n i n n i n n PZ y f s N y f s N y f s µ µ µ αβ γ µ αβ − − < ≤ = − −− − − −− γ
           ( 7 )  
 
The  marginal probability for an arbitrary  individual  n to be found in the i
th 
satisfaction interval is then (see Greene (1991)) is then the average of those individual 
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Hence, the marginal distribution is asymptotically normal. However, the marginal 
probability is well – known. It is the fraction  i p (= ( 1) ii tt − − ) of respondents who have 
responded to belong to the i 






















                                 (9) 
 
 
from which the values ( ) i µ γ −
] i
(i=1,…,10) may be identified. Notice that µ and γ 
cannot be separately identified. Mostly it is assumed that either µ 1 = 0 or that γ = 0. 
We assume that µ 1 = 0. It follows that if the individual responds i, it implies that his Z 
is in the interval (, 1 i µ µ − . We can even calculate its conditional expectation  i Z   
























                       (10) 
 
Let us now consider the limiting case where we have an infinitely fine categorization. 
  
In that case system (8) may be described by the relation N(Z) = t or inversely 
()
1 Z Nt
− = . In this case we have the satisfaction function S(t)=t.  
 
 
B. Probit OLS.( POLS) 
 
Although Ordered Probit is now included in all relevant software packages, it is still 
less easy and significantly less flexible than good old OLS. Equation (10) suggests 
that OP might be substituted by an OLS -  procedure. We call that procedure Probit 
OLS (POLS). 11   
Instead of taking a response category in as our observation to be explained, we take 
as the variable to be explained. We notice that  can assume only k discrete 
values, where k is the number of response categories. We observe that this expression 
does not depend on the individual characteristics y, fs. This is analogous to the usual 
regression situation where the 'left -hand' variable to be explained is directly observed 
without ‘correcting’ for additional information about the respondent, as revealed by 
explanatory variables. 
n i z  
n i z  
 
It follows that we look at the regression model 
ln( ) ln( )
n in n Zy f sn α βγ =+ +  ε +                  (11) 
 
We notice that the error term is a discrete random variable. However, if the number of 
observations is large, we may apply all large- sample results and deal with this OLS – 
equation as usual.  
 
More precisely, we may write the model as 
 
ln( ) ln( ) ZZ y f s η αβ γ =+= + ++  ε                 (12) 
 
The true latent observation is written as the sum of its conditional expectation plus a 
rounding -off error η, caused by the fact that we can only observe the interval in 
which the true Z is situated. We may rewrite this equation as 
 
ln( ) ln( ) ii Zyf s α βε η = ++ +  (i=1,…,k)                 (13) 
 
This may raise the question whether we can also just as well take the untransformed 
response variable i( i=0,…,10) itself as our dependent variable to be explained. This 
would yield the regression equation 
 
ε β α + + = ) ln( ) ln( fs y i                              (14) 
 12   
This is a generalisation of  the Linear Probability model (see Greene, 1991, p.813). 
Indeed we might do this but the results are statistically and intuitively not very 
attractive, unless we have only two response categories. There are two reasons for its 
unattractiveness. First, the range of the variable to be explained is finite instead of the 
real axis, which the model specification logically would require. Second, contrary to 
the practice in POLS, the values of the variable to be explained are equi-distanced by 
definition. In contrast, in POLS they are defined by the overall sample distribution. 
This explains as well, why the Linear Probability - model works for a phenomenon, 
which is two – valued, but not for multi-valued phenomena. In two-valued case it is 
equivalent to POLS, except for an affine linear transformation.  
 
 
C. Interval Regression(Cardinal Probit(CP)) 
 
 
If we drop our conventional prejudice towards cardinalism, we cannot deny that 
respondents who answer a satisfaction question by giving a numerical response are 
attempting to make a cardinal evaluation in terms of a finite interval scale. It stands to 
reason that responses are not very accurate, but the position that the respondent would 
have no intention to evaluate and ,consequently, that his answers do not have any 
information value, may be safely discarded. 
Now we look at a third method, which makes use of the cardinal  information in the 
Financial Satisfaction Question as well. It is this cardinal information, which is 
neglected by Ordered Probit. If somebody is evaluating his satisfaction level by a 
'seven', it does not imply that his satisfaction is exactly  equal to 7. For instance, the 
exact evaluation might be 6.75 or 7.25, but due to the necessary discreteness of the 
responses we have to round it off at 7. However, it would be very improbable when 
the exact evaluation would be 7.75, for in that case we would round off to 8. More 
precisely, we assume that if somebody responds 7 his true evaluation will be in the 
interval (6.5, 7.5]. A similar reasoning holds for all other response values. For the 
extremes we use an obvious modification. The observed value 0 corresponds to the 
interval [0, 0.5] and the value 10 to (9.5, 10] . If we normalise the scale from [0,10] to 
the [0,1] - interval, the intervals will be [0,0.05] ,…, (0.95, 1]. 13   
 
Let us now assume that the satisfaction S may be explained to a certain extent by a 
vector of explanatory variables x , including log - income. More precisely, we assume 
 
      0 (; SN x 0 , 1 ) β β ′ = +                 (15) 
 
where N(.) stands for the (standard-) normal distribution function. We stress that (15) 
is a non-stochastic specification. For estimation purposes we add a random term and 
assume 
 
                                              SN 0 (; x 0 , 1 ) β βε ′ =+ +     (16) 
 
We see that satisfaction is determined by a structural part and a random disturbance 
ε . We assume the random disturbance ε  to be normally distributed with expectation 
equal to zero. Its variance σ
2 has to be estimated. As usual, we assume that cov( , ) x ε = 
0. Notice, that this model, and especially the specification of eqs. (15) and  (16), is an 
assumption. If another model would fit the data better, we have to replace it. 
However, let us assume it holds. 
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                     (17) 
 
Comparison with eq.(7) reveals that the likelihood is equal to the   
Probit- likelihood except that the unknown µi's are replaced by known normal 
quantiles ui.  The β 's are estimated by maximizing the log-likelihood.  
It follows that it is possible to estimate a cardinal satisfaction function from the same 
data by using the additional cardinal information. It is an empirical matter, which 
model is chosen.  14   
This Cardinal Probit (CP) -approach is a special case of what is called in the literature 
sometimes the Group-wise or Interval Regression Method, where information on the 
regressand is only available group-wise. This is frequently the case in public statistics, 
eg.. with respect to household income which is only known per income bracket.  
 
D. Cardinal OLS (COLS) 
 
The reader will not be surprised that the trick of eq.(10), which we used in order to 




















                   (18) 
 
and we formulate the regression equation  
 
ln( ) ln( ) i Zyf si α βε =+ + +  η  (i=1,…,k)               (19) 
 
In this section we listed four possible methods to estimate an explanatory model for 
satisfaction. The difference between methods A and C is that A does not employ the 
cardinal information in the satisfaction question, while C does employ that additional 
information. Methods B and D may be viewed as derivatives of A and C, respectively. 
The essential difference is between the acceptance or non –acceptance of the cardinal 
information. The two variations B and D are of much practical importance, as they 
make it possible to replace the non-linear Probit method by more easily applicable 
OLS. 
The question is now how the different estimates are related. We leave this question 
for section 4 and go now to look after a much older competitor. 
 
3. The income evaluation question 
 
It is sometimes forgotten that the present wave of happiness research was preceded in 
the seventies by another attempt, which had certainly points in common with the 
present literature. This cluster of research is now frequently called the Leyden School 15   
after the Dutch university, where this research started. Van Praag, Kapteyn and 
Hagenaars were the main contributors. This line of research was started by Van Praag 
(1968, 1971) and it may be seen as a forerunner to present satisfaction question 
research. 
In the spirit of the economic literature of that time it was assumed that satisfaction 
with income was synonymous with welfare or well - being. Although also economists 
(including this author) paid lip service to the idea that income was only dimension of 
life, this feature of reality was ignored in the practice of developing theory and 
applied research, where income was seen as the only determinant of welfare. Now we 
would say that the Leyden School was focusing on financial satisfaction. In this sense 
the subject of Leyden was narrower than that of present happiness research where 
various life domains, like job (Clark and Oswald, 1994), health (Ferrer-i-Carbonell 
and Van Praag, 2002) are studied as well. However, we should also realize that in 
those days so- called 'subjective' satisfaction questions were not put in surveys to 
which economists had access. There were some 'soft' surveys organized by 
sociologists or psychologists, where such questions could be found, but those surveys 
did not contain reliable information about income and other 'economic' variables. 
Sociologists and psychologists were not interested in those mundane regions of life 
and left it to the 'dismal science' to bother about the effect of income.  
The Leyden results are empirically based on the so - called Income Evaluation 
Question (IEQ). The IEQ has been posed in various countries. Here we are especially 
interested in comparing the outcomes with the previous results, derived from the 
Income Satisfaction Questions. Fortunately, the IEQ has been posed in the GSOEP- 
data set in the waves 1992 and 1997. This gives us the opportunity for a direct 
comparison between the results based on the Financial Satisfaction question with 
those derived from the IEQ. We utilise the 1997 wave. 
Our first question here is whether the IEQ provides at least the same information as 
the Financial Satisfaction Question. Our second question is whether the results 
derived from the IEQ are comparable or nearly the same as the results, derived from 
the FS-question. Third, we are interested in the question whether the IEQ provides 
more information than the Financial Satisfaction Question.  
The IEQ runs as follows: 
 
The Income Evaluation Question (IEQ) (mid - interval version). 16   
Whether you feel an income is good or not so good depends on your personal life 
circumstances and expectations. 
In your case you would call your net household income:  
 
a very low income if it would equal DM   __________  
a low income if it would equal DM __________  
a still insufficient income if it would equal DM __________  
a just sufficient income if it would equal DM __________  
a good income if it would equal DM __________  
a very good income if it would equal DM __________  
 
There are several wordings of this question around. First, the number of levels has 
varied between five and nine. When it was first posed in a Belgian survey (Van Praag 
(1971)), nine verbally described levels have been used. In Russian surveys (see 
Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Van Praag (2001)) five levels have been used. Second, in the 
earliest versions (1971) the question was formulated as: 
 
The Income evaluation Question (interval - version). 
Given my present household circumstances, I would consider a monthly household income  
 
An income below  $???                as  a very bad income       
 An  income    between $ ????   and  $???   as a bad income 
 An  income    between $ ????  and  $???   as an insufficient income 
 An  income    between $ ????  and  $???   as a sufficient income 
 An  income    between $ ????  and  $???   as a good income 
 An  income    above $ ????       as a very good income 
 
When introducing this type of question, which requires more from a respondent than 
the usual financial satisfaction question, survey agencies predicted that the response 
ratio would be very bad and that, if there would be any response, the respondents 
would not take this question seriously. It appeared in practice that those questions 
have a lower response than usual questions but not dramatically so. It may also be that 
the response is incomplete, but the question may still be used if at least three levels 
are filled in. Moreover, the amounts should be ordered in the sense that a good 
income requires a higher amount than a bad income. Finally, the response is 17   
considered to be unrealistic if a very bad income is much higher than the respondent’s 
current income or a very good income is much less than current income. Such cases 
represent a small percentage of the response and they are usually excluded from 
further analysis. 
The essential difference between the FS- question and the IEQ is the inversion of 
stimulus and response. In the FS-question own current income, say yc , is the stimulus 
and the individual's evaluation on a finite interval scale is the response. In the IEQ the 
stimuli are evaluations, expressed in terms of verbal labels like 'bad' and 'good'. The 
responses are income levels ybad and ygood. As different individuals have a different 
idea on what is a 'good' or a 'bad' income, it is obvious that we do not get one financial 
satisfaction function, but that each responding individual will have his own FS - 
function. Therefore, Van Praag (1971) used the term individual welfare function of 
income(WFI).   
We now analyse the results of the IEQ. Let us denote the answers by of individual n 
by c1,… , c6.  For analysis we have two possibilities. The first one is an ordinal 
analysis, where we consider the separate answers and look for regression equations 
 
ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ii ci i cyf s i α βγ =++ ε +    (i=1,…,6)  (20) 
 
The question is then what these coefficients are and whether these coefficients are 
equal over the six equations. We leave the empirical results for the next section. 
Now we look at the cardinal concept of the Individual Welfare Function of Income 
(WFI). In Van Praag (1968) it was argued that individual welfare (read financial 
satisfaction in present days' terminology) was measurable as a cardinal concept 
between 0 and 1. In 1968 this was evidently an almost heretical idea, not in favour 
with mainstream economics (see e.g. Seidl (1994) for a fierce but belated critique). 
The approximate relationship was argued to be a lognormal distribution function with 
parameters  µ and σ. We notice that the specification (16) is also a log - normal 
specification if one of the dimensions of the vector x is ln(yc). In later years Van Praag 
(1971) and Van Praag and Kapteyn (1973) estimated the µ and σ per individual on the 
basis of the response on the IEQ. They assumed for the ' mid -interval ' version of the 
IEQ that the answers c1,… , c6  correspond with satisfaction levels 1/12,  (2i-1)/12 and 
11/12 respectively; this was called the Equal Quantile Assumption (Van Praag 18   
(1991,1994)) provided empirical evidence for this assumption. Moreover, it was 
assumed that satisfaction U(c;µ, σ)= Λ(c; µ, σ) where Λ(c; µ, σ)= N(ln(c); µ, σ). The 
function Λ(.) stands for the log-normal distribution function. Estimation of µ and σ is 
possible per individual. We have six or, more generally, k observations per individual 
and we assume that  
 
 








=  (21) 
 
We note that the c-value is comparable to  in the Cardinal Probit situation of six 
observations per individual by COLS. The only difference is that the c's are equated to 
interval medians instead of interval means.  We estimate the parameters  and  for 





















n in n c µ σ            (22) 
 
Then the estimated  ˆn µ  is explained over the sample of N observations by the equation  
 
, ˆ ln( ) ln( ) nc n n yf s µ αβ =+ γ +     (23) 
where yc,n   stands for the current income of individual n. Later on we shall consider 
those regression results. Here we already notice that both coefficients are always 
estimated as significantly positive. The income effect α equals roughly 0.6 and the 
family size coefficient β equals 0.10.  
Up to now it has proved difficult to explain the  - parameter, which was called by 
Van Praag (1968,1971) the welfare sensitivity, to an acceptable extent by means of 
individual explanatory variables. It seems to vary over individuals in a random 
manner. Like in many other studies, also here we assume σ  to be constant over 
individuals in the same population. We set it equal to the average over individuals. 
Hagenaars (1986) found from international comparisons that the parameter σ appears 
to be related with the log – standard deviation of the population’s income distribution. 19   
Her result suggests that welfare sensitivity is higher in more unequal societies. In the 
present survey (GSOEP 97) we found an average value of σ = 0.453. 
We can now find the evaluation of any income y  by someone with individual 
parameters (µ(yc), σ). It equals   
 
(ln( ) ( )) (ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) )
(ln( ); ( ), ) ( ) ( )
cc
c
yy y y f s






γ −       (24) 
 
or using its ordinal equivalent  on the ( , ) −∞∞-axis 
 
(ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ) (ln( ) ) c yy f s y α βγ µ
σσ
− −− −
=              (25) 
 
We notice that the IEQ effectively introduces two concepts of an Individual Welfare 
Function. The first concept is generated by keeping µ constant. It gives a schedule of 
how individuals evaluate varying (fictitious) income levels from the perspective of 
their own income, which is kept unchanged at the present level. We call it the virtual 
or short- term welfare function. It can be estimated for a specific individual by posing  
the IEQ to that individual. 
The second concept is the welfare function according to which individuals with 
different  incomes evaluate their own  income  in reality. It is an inter - individual 
concept. We call it the true or long – term welfare function. This function has to be 
derived by using a sample of different individuals. From (23) it follows that the true 
welfare function is  
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In fig. 1.a we sketch both functions. We see that the true welfare function has a much 
weaker slope than the virtual. It implies that income changes are ex ante heavier 
perceived than when they are experienced in reality. Actually, the two concepts 
correspond with the two concepts of the decision and the experienced utility function, 
distinguished by Kahneman, Wakker and Sarin (1997). The virtual welfare function 
describes the way in which a specific individual evaluates different income levels, 
irrespective of whether it is his real income or a (remote) prospect. It is the perceived 
ex ante relationship between income and welfare on which the individual bases his 
decisions. The true welfare function describes how individuals, who experience those 
incomes themselves, evaluate incomes in reality. 
The welfare function maps incomes on the evaluation range [0,1]. A second (and 
easier) way to consider the welfare function is to map the range to the real axis 
 and to consider the function u(y)  (, −∞ +∞)
 
σ γ β α )/ - ln(fs) - ln(y)   y u . ). 1 (( ) ( − =                            (27) 21   
 
The two representations are ordinally equivalent. We call the latter the linear 
transform. The linear transforms of the virtual and the true welfare functions are 
sketched in Fig.1.b. The short – term version corresponds to α= 0. It follows again 










Fig. 1.b The virtual and true welfare functions (linear transform). 
 
The difference between the short- and long term concepts is best explained by the 
following simple thought experiment. Let us assume that somebody with an initial 
income y gets an income increase of y, yielding a new income  y + y . Initially the 
increase will be evaluated by his short – term welfare function yielding an increase 
from point A  to point B.  After a while income norms will adapt to the new situation 
and this will be reflected in the parameter µ that will increase by α.y . Hence, after a 
first euphoria there will be some disappointment, as the evaluation falls from point B 
to point C. 
This is the so -called preference drift effect, which was introduced and estimated by 
Van Praag (1971). It is only not there when α = 0. If  α = 1, in the long term an 
income increase will not yield any increase in satisfaction. 
We notice that the IEQ effectively introduces two concepts of an Individual Welfare 
Function. The virtual welfare function describes the way in which a specific 22   
individual evaluates different income levels. It is the perceived ex ante relationship 
between income and welfare on which the individual bases his decisions. The true 
welfare function describes how individuals, who experience those incomes 
themselves, evaluate incomes in reality. 
The most interesting point is that different individuals have a different idea of what 
presents a ‘good’ income, a ‘sufficient’ income, etc.. It depends on their own net 
household income and their household circumstances, in this case characterised by 
their household size. It shows that evaluations are relative. In case that  =0, the 
evaluations would be wholly absolute, that is, independent of current income. In case 
that  =1 the evaluation is completely relative. We will see from the table that we are 
somewhere in between, as α turns out to be about 0.5 or .06.. The phenomenon that 
evaluations are drifting along with rising income has been termed preference drift (see 
Van Praag (1971)). It is measured by . This is similar to an effect, independently 
discovered by the psychologists Brickman and Campbell (1971). They called it the 
hedonic treadmill effect.  These authors and also Easterlin (1974,1995,2001) tend to 
the hypothesis that adaptation would be complete, i.e. α=1. We were unable to 
establish this result empirically. 
Obviously this is a puzzling effect. The evaluation of a specific income in 
combination with a specific household to support should, ideally and according to 
traditional economic models, be independent of the situation of the evaluator. 
However, we see that in practice it does depend on the income of the evaluator. It 
shows most clearly that the notion of 'a good income' is partly relative and 
psychologically determined. This holds as well for the situation of 'poverty' (see 
Goedhart et al.1977). 
 
4. Empirical evidence 
 
Let us now go to the empirical analysis. We consider the GSOEP – data set and more 
precisely the 1997 wave
2, where we restrict ourselves to the subset of West- German 
workers. The data set is so interesting because it contains the Financial Satisfaction 
                                                 
2 We use here a preliminary unauthorised release of the 1997-wave, which slightly differs from the 
final authorised version. In the final version there are found a few observations in category 0 as well. 
See also Plug et al. (1997). 23   
Question and the IEQ simultaneously. We shall now compare the empirical outcomes 
of the approaches described before. 
In Table 1 we tabulate the response fractions for the eleven categories. 
 

















Number of observations    4964 
 
In Table 2 we present the Ordered Probit - estimates of the unknown parameter 
values.  
                                                 
3 See footnote 1. 24   
 
Table 2. Estimates of three different Income Satisfaction equations by Ordered Probit, 
GSOEP 1997 




Constant  -3.061 -10.224  -3.093 -10.232  -3.128  -10.319 
Ln(Household  income)  0.734 20.251  0.738 20.113  0.738  20.093 
Ln(Family Size)  -0.223  -6.800         
Ln(Adults)     -0.223  -6.269  -0.246  -6.751 
Ln(Children + 1)      -0.128  -3.680  -0.164  -4.465 
Family  Structure       0.070  2.844 
          
Intercepts*          
µ0  -   ∞   -∞    -∞   
µ1  -   ∞   -∞    -∞   
µ2  0   0   0   
µ3  0.556   0.556   0.557   
µ4  1.049   1.048   1.049   
µ5  1.495   1.495   1.496   
µ6  2.057   2.057   2.058   
µ7  2.482   2.482   2.483   
µ8  3.134   3.134   3.136   
µ9  3.970   3.970   3.972   
µ10  4.617   4.617   4.620   
µ11  +   ∞   +∞    +∞   
          
N  4964   4964   4964   
Log-Likelihood  -9310   -9310   -9306   
Pseudo R
2  0.020   0.020   0.021   
*µ1=- ∞, because the first response category is empty in this sample. 
 
In Table 2 we present three estimates of the financial satisfaction equation to be 
estimated. The first version is the one, described by equation (5). We have two 
explanatory variables, viz. household income and the number of children plus one 
4. 
In the second version we distinguish between children under 17 living at home and 
other persons living in the household. The latter class will be called ‘adults’. In the 
third specification we add a third variable ‘family structure’, which equals zero if the 
respondent lives alone, one if the household has two working adults, and two if there 
are two adults in the household of which only one has paid work. This ordering 
reflects the idea that household chores are pretty fixed and that they are easier to bear 
by a family with one person working outside than by a family where the two adults 
are working in a paid job. The single person or the incomplete family bears the 
heaviest burden in this respect.  
The estimation results,  when we use POLS, are given in Table 3. 
                                                 
4 We add one such that we do not get a non- defined logarithm of zero if the number of children equals zero. 25   
Table 3. POLS results for the income satisfaction equations, GSOEP 




Constant -5.475  -19.849  -5.504  -19.663  -5.534  -19.770 
Ln(Household income)  0.678  19.829  0.681  19.581  0.681  19.584 
Ln(Family  Size)  -0.206  -6.624      
Ln(Adults)     -0.205  -6.122  -0.227  -6.597 
Ln(Children + 1)      -0.118  -3.645  -0.152  -4.407 
Family Structure          0.065  2.842 
          
N  4964    4964  4964  
Adjusted R2   0.073    0.073    0.075   
 
We see that the corresponding t- values are almost the same. The coefficients look 
multiples of each other except for the constant. 
The cardinal CP-  or interval- regression approach yields the following estimates and 
again we see that the ratios of coefficients are almost the same while the t-ratios 
hardly differ. 
 
Table 4. The Financial Satisfaction Question estimated by Cardinal Probit. 
Variable  Effects t-ratio effects t-ratio effects t-ratio 
        
Constant  -2.524 -18.236 -2.536 -18.055 -2.550 -18.159
Ln(Household  income) 0.342 19.923 0.343 19.652 0.343 19.657 
Ln(Family Size)  -0.102  -6.568        
Ln(Adults)      -0.101 -6.019 -0.112 -6.480 
Ln(Children  +  1)      -0.060 -3.697 -0.076 -4.430 
Family  Structure       0.032  2.765 
        
Sigma  0.466 94.190 0.466 94.190 0.465 94.184 
        
N  4964  4964  4964  
Log-Likelihood  -9500  -9500  -9496  
Pseudo  R2  0.0198  0.0199  0.0202  
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Finally we use the COLS – approach with yields table (2.11) and again we see that the 
ratios of coefficients and the t-ratios are almost the same. 
 
Table 5. The Financial Satisfaction Question estimated by COLS 
Variable  effects t-ratio effects t-ratio Effects t-ratio 
        
Constant  -2.464 -16.738 -2.477 -16.575 -2.492 -16.678 
Ln(Household  income)  0.354 19.388 0.355 19.123 0.355 19.126 
Ln(Family Size)  -0.108  -6.515         
Ln(Adults)      -0.107 -5.966  -0.118 -6.427 
Ln(Children  +  1)      -0.063 -3.669  -0.081 -4.403 
Family  Structure       0.034  2.766 
          
N  4964   4964   4964  
Adjusted  R2  0.070   0.070   0.072  
 
 
The four methods used have the same objective, that is, the estimation of the equation 
 
ln( ) ln( ) Zy f s α βγ =+ + ε +                   (28) 
 
where Z stands for a satisfaction index. The equation may be used for the derivation 
of family equivalence scales
5. If ln(fs) increases to ln(fs) + fs ∆ , the question arises by 
how much the individual has to be compensated in his income  ln(y). We find   
 
  ln( ) ln( ) yf s
β
α
∆= − ∆                         (29) 
 
It follows that the indifference curves between income and family size are described 
by 
 




=  (30) 
 
where   and  0 y 0 fs stand for the reference income and reference family size, 
respectively. Now it is interesting to see whether the ratio 
β
α
 is the same, irrespective 
of the four methods used. We give the different values in Table 6. 
 
                                                 




Table 6. Equivalence scale parameter calculated via different methods. 
 
method  OP POLS CP COLS  IEQ 
β/α  0.32 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.26 
 
We see that the values of the ratio, estimated via four different methods, are virtually 
identical. Actually, this is less surprising than it looks like, if we realize that this 
equivalence scale describes an indifference curve, which is defined by the Financial 
Satisfaction - question. Everybody who evaluates his income by the same number is 
on the same indifference curve. The four methods yield different monotonic 
transforms of satisfaction, but their ordinal information is the same.  The fifth column, 
derived from the IEQ, will be considered in a moment. 
Let us now consider what is the relation between POLS and COLS - estimates.We 
denote as before the ordinal variable, belonging to a specific response category, by 
ln( ) and the corresponding cardinal value by ln(). We assume ln() =f(ln( )). 
As the categories are ordered , we may assume that  f(.) is a monotonically increasing 
function. Let us assume for a moment that both variables would be exactly measured 
on a continuous scale instead of on a discrete scale, then the marginal distributions of 
both variables would be normally distributed with parameters (
z  z z
)
z 
, µ σ   and ( ) , µ σ   , 
respectively.  
We may express a fraction of respondents to a specific category either with respect to 
 or with respect to  . We have   z  z
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It follows that the function f(.) is a linear affine transformation. We have  
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where  D is a constant which can be easily calculated. Indeed if we apply this 
regression (on k observations) we find for the German data the regression result  
 
ln( ) 0.5359ln( ) 0.1965 ZZ =+   . 
 
with an R
2 of 0.99.  
 
 It follows that, if  l  is a linear combination of variables x , then the same will 
hold for l , where the trade - off ratios will be the same. 
n( ) z 
n( ) z 
It follows that OP, POLS ,CP and COLS are for practical purposes equivalent for the 
computations of trade - off ratios. The C- versions employ the  cardinal part of the 
information as well.  
The implicit cardinalisation on which Probit and POLS are based will be called from 
now on the frequentist cardinalisation because it is based on the frequency distribution 
of satisfaction levels. The cardinalisation on which CP and COLS are based will be 
called the satisfaction cardinalisation from now on. We notice that one is a linear 
transformation of the other. 
 
It is evident that we may also derive family equivalence scales from the IEQ. The 
estimates of equation (23) are presented in Table 7. 
 
Table 7. The IEQ – estimates for µ . 
Variable Effects  t-ratio  Effects t-ratio  effects  t-ratio 
Constant 3.611  54.308  3.572  52.302  3.574  52.309 
Ln(Household income)  0.527  61.964  0.533  60.667  0.533  60.644 
Ln(Family  Size)  0.121  14.819      
Ln(Adults)      0.090 8.093 0.089 7.958 
Ln(Children + 1)      0.096  11.976  0.083  5.355 
Family Structure          0.011  0.963 
σ  0.453    0.453  0.453  
N  3962    3962  3962  
Adjusted  R2  0.631    0.632  0.632  
 
It is obvious that we may derive for the individual welfare function household 
equivalence scales by requiring that households with different family sizes fs0  and fs 1 29   
enjoy an equal welfare level according to the true welfare function. This implies that 




0 0 (/) yy f s f s =                            (35) 
 
where the ratio β/α is replaced by β/(1-α). We notice that this power is 0.26. This 
value is evidently very well in line with the other values in Table 6. Hence our 
conclusion is that the ordinal information, which can be extracted from the true 
welfare function is the same as that which is provided by the FS- question. 
Obviously, we may also try to explain the six separate responses on the IEQ, that is 
the household cost levels ln(ci). The resulting regression equations are given in table 
8. 
  
Table 8. Ordinal analysis of the six level equations of the IEQ. 











t-ratio effects  t-ratio 
i  3.499 33.653 3.422 42.488 3.447 46.647 3.558 51.176 3.788 51.033 3.961 41.326 
i  0.468 35.134 0.507 49.193 0.527 55.774 0.539 60.572 0.550 57.904 0.571 46.534 
βi  0.165 12.870 0.149 14.996 0.141 15.490 0.130 15.144 0.089  9.706  0.056  4.715 
 
System Weighted R-Square: 0.2318 
The errors are strongly correlated as we see from Table 9.  
 
Table 9. The cross-model error correlation matrix. 
 C 1 C 2 C 3 C 4 C 5 C 6 
C1  1  0.906 0.836 0.744 0.611 0.467 
C2  0.906  1  0.963 0.887 0.784 0.630 
C3  0.836  0.963 1 0.951  0.856  0.706 
C4  0.744 0.887 0.951  1  0.917 0.772 
C5  0.611 0.784 0.856 0.917  1  0.899 
C6  0.467 0.630 0.706 0.772 0.899  1 
 
For a more extensive ordinal analysis see Van Praag and Van der Sar (1988), where 
similar results for other data sets were found. Our conclusion is that the coefficients 
for the separate levels are not equal, but that they follow exactly the same pattern as in 
Van Praag and Van der Sar. At a low level of satisfaction the dependency on own 30   
income is considerable at 0.442, but it increases as the level of satisfaction increases 
up to 0.593 at the highest level of satisfaction.  
The family size effect β behaves just in the opposite way. It falls with rising levels of 
satisfaction (see also (Van Praag, Flik (1992)) for a comparison with other European 
data sets). We may stamp the effect of family size as reflecting real needs, while the 
dependency on own income stands for a psychological reference effect. Our findings 
may then be summarized as: when individuals become richer, their real needs become 
less pressing and their norms become more determined by reference effects. 
 
We may calculate for each verbal level i the income amount yi , which is evaluated by 
i. For that level there holds 
 
i i i i i fs y y γ β α + + = ) ln( ) ln( ) ln(     (i=1,…,6)             (36) 
 














) ln(    (i=1,…,6)               (37) 
 
We notice that the resulting family size elasticity is βi /(1-i ). We notice that the 
elasticities and the corresponding household equivalence scales hardly vary between 
the satisfaction levels i. 
Now we present the household equivalence scales for the six levels i  and those 
derived from the µ - equation side by side.  
 
Table    10. Household equivalence scales derived form the IEQ, GSOEP 1997 
Household size  C1 C 2 C 3 C 4 C 5 C 6 µ 
1  81% 81%  81%  82% 87% 91% 84% 
2  100% 100%  100%  100% 100% 100% 100% 
3  113% 113%  113%  112% 108% 105% 111% 
4  124% 123%  123%  122% 115% 109% 119% 
5  133% 132%  131%  129% 120% 113% 127% 
6  141% 139%  139%  136% 124% 115% 133% 
7  147% 146%  145%  142% 128% 118% 138% 
8  154% 152%  151%  148% 131% 120% 143% 
 
We see that the differences between all subjective scales are rather small. 31   
 
Van Praag and Flik (1992) derived equivalence scales for various European countries  
by the same IEQ- method. They noticed that the scales in various countries are not the 
same, reflecting cultural differences and differences in social systems. See also 
Hagenaars (1986) and Goedhart et al. (1977).  
Finally, it is interesting to compare the results derived from the IEQ- responses with 
our results, based on Financial Satisfaction -responses. The resulting trade- offs, 
derived from the true WFI, and the ratios found earlier are very similar. The 
additional result that we can derive from the IEQ and which we cannot find from 
financial satisfaction questions, because they only refer to current income, is the 
virtual WFI. As said before the true WFI corresponds to the experienced  utility 







Let us now summarise the conclusions of this paper. 
 
•  We found that income satisfaction can be explained by objective factors. This 
yields trade - off coefficients between family size and income and trade- off 
coefficients between adults and children. 
•  We found that the Ordered Probit - method is based on an implicit frequentist 
utility assumption, which may be interpreted as a cardinalist approach as well. 
•  We saw that we may replace the O. Probit method by the method of Probit- 
Adjusted Ordinary Least Squares (POLS) and that the results do not vary except for a 
multiplication factor. 
•  We found that we can use the cardinal information in Financial Satisfaction 
Questions leading to a Cardinal Probit - and a Cardinal OLS - approach. 
•  The frequentist and the cardinalist approach imply two different 
cardinalisations of satisfaction, which are related by an affine linear transformation. 32   
•  The empirical estimates according to those four estimation methods are 
strongly related and yield (almost) the same trade - off - ratios. 
•  The POLS - and COLS methods are computationally easier. 
•  An earlier way to study income satisfaction in a quantitative way has been 
developed by Van Praag and Kapteyn ('Leyden School'). In this chapter we compare 
their results derived from the Income Evaluation Question with results derived from 
the Financial Satisfaction Question (FSQ). We found that both methods yield 
approximately the same trade - off coefficients.  
•  The FSQ yields an experienced utility function in the terms of Kahneman et al. 
The IEQ yields a virtual and a true individual welfare function, which concepts 
coincide with Kahneman et al.'s decision utility and experienced utility functions, 
respectively.    The result of this comparison is that most results derived by WFI- 
analysis by or in the spirit of the 'Leyden School' could have been derived by analysis 
of the FSQ as well. 
•  The FSQ is easier to answer for to respondents than the IEQ. Moreover, the 
IEQ - format does not seem applicable when we ask for Health Satisfaction, Housing 
Satisfaction, etc., while the FSQ can be used. However, the IEQ yields information on 
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